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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST ATE OF UTAH
CHARLES

J.

PRUCE,

Applicant-Appellant
- vs. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION,
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY, and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12650

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF'
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant applied to the Industrial Commission
for a hearing seeking an award for an injury he claimed
occurred while he was employed by Fruehauf Corporation.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
The Industrial Commission denied appellant's claim
for Workman's Compensation. Appellant's Motion for
Review was also denied by the Commission.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the disposition
reached by the Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant at the time in question was 63 years
old. He was employed as a mechanic by respondent Fruehauf and had been for some 17 years. As an employee
he was insured for industrial injuries and, in addition,
he was provided with non-industrial accident and health
insurance coverage including hospital, surgical expense
and loss of income benefits.
The insurance carrier for workmen's compensation
benefits was Continental Casualty; the insurance carrier
for non-industrial health & accident claims was Connecticut General Life Insurance Company. Prior to 1968, appellant had filed claims under both coverages. On his
own admission, he was aware of the distinction between
the two companies and that respondent's office procedure
required that accident and health claims be filed through
Fred R. Sterling (R. 52), respondent's office manager, and
the reports of injury relating to industrial accidents covered by Workman's Compensation, were to be filed with
the job foreman (R. 52-53). In fact, he had filed two
previous claims for industrial injuries (R. 50) as well as
made previous claims under the group health and accident policy. (R. 51).
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Beginning in September of 1955 and periodically
thereafter, Mr. Pruce was examined and treated for various eye problems by Doctors Spear, Rees and McDonald. (R. 17).
On May 6, 1968, Mr. Pruce, accompanied by his
wife, was examined by Dr. Rees at his office for a complaint of vision problems with his right eye. Dr. Rees determined that the applicant had a detached retina and arranged for him to be admitted that day at the Holy Cross
Hospital for eye surgery.
Mr. Pruce was admitted at the Holy Cross Hospital
for surgery on the right eye on May 6, 1968. At the time
applicant was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital, he told
the admission clerk that his insurance carrier was Connecticut General Insurance Company, and that it was a
Group Health Policy with his employer. (R-47-58 and
121). He was discharged on May 18, 1968. (R. 121).
On May 24, 1968, Mr. Pruce signed a Connecticut
General Life Insurance Company all-purpose group insurance claim form (R. 151-15 2), in which he made claim
for himself, describing the accident or sickness as being
a detached retina with the date of onset of the condition
being March 2, 1968, and that the accident or sickness
was not due to employment.
Thereafter Connecticut General Life Insurance Company paid doctor and hospital bills totaling $856.20 and
disability benefits to Mr. Pruce for the period May 14,
1968, through June 30, 1968, in the amount of $195.71.
(R. 18-20).
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Prior to seeking medical care and undergoing surgery, appellant had not told anyone in a supervisory capacity that his eye problem was related to an on-the-job
accident. (R. 5 5). The first time he did tell a supervisor
that the claim was industrially connected was when he
realized that the group health and accident policy, under
which he had filed a claim, (R. 151) would not pay all
of the doctor's charges. (R. 55, 85-87). Upon learning
this, he advised Fred Sterling, respondent's office manager, that he felt that his claim should have been processed as a workman's compensation claim. (R. 62-63 and
pp. 85-87).
Up to this point there was no evidence that there was
ever a report of an accidental injury, industrial or otherwise, nor is there any record that a workman's compensation claim was filed or processed with the defendant
in the usual manner. There was later located in the appellant's personnel file an undated "Employer's First Report of Injury" form (R. 150), which was completed by
the appellant in his own handwriting and signed after he
returned to work. (R. 61-62). Company procedure required that workmen's compensation "Employer's First
Report of Injury" forms be completed by a foreman or
supervisor, (R. 52-53), who at that time was Curtis Barentine. (R. 103), Mr. Barentine could not recall a report of
injury from appellant. (R. 104). In searching the records,
he found an "Employer's First Report of Injury" filled
out in appellant's own handwriting. (R. 105). Barentine
did not know how the report had been received since usual
procedure would have resulted in the form being process-
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ed by the company, typed with several copies, and signed
by the supervisor. Because this was not done, the claim
was never treated as a compensation claim. (R. 105).
Harold Weatherby, the Shop Steward for the Union,
later testified appellant had given him a hand-written report after appellant had had his operation and that he
had put the report on Mr. Barentine's desk. (R. 119).
The appellant's hand-written report (R. 150) alleges
an accident, when the landing gear on a loaded trailer
slipped out of gear, causing a jar to the appellant and that
a report of injury was made to Dennis Phillips. Dennis
Phillips testified at the hearing that at no time did appellant report to him that he had sustained an injury as a
result of any difficulty he had had with a trailer. (R. 79).
Another report is usually prepared for the company's
Safety Department whenever the company becomes aware
of an accident. Such a safety report was not found in the
company records. (R. 107).
There is some question regarding the date of the
alleged injury. In the hand-written First Report of Injury, appellant stated that the date of injury was May 2,
1968. (R. 150). On the claim form to the health and
accident insurer, the "date of accident or beginning of
sickness" was stated as March 6, 1968. (R. 151). The appellant's Application for Hearing, filed with the Industrial Commission sets the injury date on May 31, 1968.
(R. 1). At the hearing appellant testified that the date
of May 31, 1968, was incorrect, that he saw Dr. Rees on
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May 6, 1968, and that the injury happened six or seven
days before. (R. 36). On cross-examination, he further
confused the issue by adding that two to three days after
the injury he noticed difficulty with his eye. It was six or
seven days later that he saw Dr. Rees. (R. 49). Therefore, on applicant's own information the incident may
have occurred as early as March 6, 1968, (R. 151), or on
April 30, or May 1, (R. 36) or on April 26 or 27 (R. 49)
or on May 2, (R. 150).
ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

THE HEARING EXAMINER WAS FREE OF
ERROR IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY CONCERNING STATEMENTS BY APPELLANT'S
WIFE.
A. THE HEARING EXAMINER IS FREE TO
RECEIVE HEARSAY STATEMENTS PROVIDED THERE IS OTHER COMPETENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH HIS FINDINGS ARE
BASED.
The law is well settled in Utah that a decision by the
Industrial Commission must be based upon some legal and
competent evidence, that a finding cannot be based solely
upon hearsay evidence. Hackford vs. Industrial Commission, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 ( 1961), and earlier
Utah cases cited therein. The Utah Supreme Court has
taken this position in interpreting 35-1-88 U.C.A. (1953)
which states that the Commission is not bound by common
law or statutory rules of evidence.
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The case of Ogden Iron Works vs. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942) proYides a
helpful explanation.
To say the Commission may receive and consider
and act upon hearsay evidence, does not mean that
the Commission is obliged to act upon all hearsay
evidence presented, but only that it may act upon
it where the circumstances are such that the evidence offered is deemed by the Commission to be
trustworthy. Legislation such as this Act, made
with a view to further social interests, must be interpreted not only from the juridical, but also the
social point of view, and so as to give material
justice its due, while formal jurisprudence has to
stand back. There should be no anxious clinging
to a dead letter; the interpretation should be liberal
and in keeping with the spirit of the legislation.
In this statute we have not only an explicit sanction
for a departure from the common-law methods of
proof, but a direct legislative command that the
Commission "shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence." In the
face of this legislative provision, what justification is there for rendering the law subject to technical common-law rules of proof?
at pp. 497, 498.
The court then referred to its earlier decisions that
a finding of fact could not be based solely upon hearsay.
Then to resolve the apparent conflict between the Compensation Act allowing hearsay and the decisions requiring other competent evidence, the court said:
What then is its purpose and effect? Clearly it is
corroborative in its nature and value. Like circumstances and actions of persons apart from the
specific act involved, it may serve as supplemental
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proof or corroborative proof of facts shown or
properly inferable from facts shown by legal evidence, which legal evidence, standing alone, may
not be suficient to satisfy the Commission. Or such
hearsay evidence may be so satisfying and convincing to the Commission that when supported by a
residium of evidence competent in a court of law,
it may justify the Commission in inferring a principal fact. It should not be said that all evidence
held to be objectionable in courts of law is without
probative force. The rules of exclusion in the law
of evidence as applied in court of law is largely
a result of the jury system. Its purpose is to keep
from the jury all irrelevant matters, and collateral
matters, which might tend to confuse or mislead
the jury from a consideration of the real questions
involved. So when the jury is absent the rules of
exclusion are less strictly enforced, the assumption
being that the Court will not be confused or misled by that which is irrelevant and inconclusive.
And where the statute has expressly done away
with the rules of common law as to evidence, and
provided the Commission shall make such investigation as it may deem necessary to arrive at the
truth and ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties, hearsay evidence may be considered by it
in determining a question of fact, whenever the
circumstances of the case are such as to entitle it to
credit, irrespective of any credit reposed in the
speaker.
pp. 500, 501.
In conclusion the court said:
The question is whether there is any evidence, competent in a court of law, which when supported
and corroborated by the hearsay evidence, justifies
or sustains the findings of the Commission.
pp. 501, 502.
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B. THERE WAS AN ABUNDANCE OF COMPETENT AND LEGAL EVIDENCE UPON
WHICH THE COMMISSION COULD BASE
ITS FINDINGS.
The decision of the Industrial Commission as expressed in its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law is
based in large measure upon the testimony of Dr. Robert
L. Rees, appellant's own physician. The Commission's
Findings and Conclusions refer to the testimony of Dr.
Rees, quoting from it extensively. It was Dr. Ree's considered opinion that the appellant's detached retina resulted from natural and progressive causes independent
of an industrial accident as alleged. It should be clear
from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
hearing examiner that the so-called "hearsay" evidence
was not persuasive in deciding the case. Indeed, it is not
even mentioned by the examiner. Instead, he relied upon
Dr. Ree's opinion that the holes in the retina and resulting detachment were caused by the natural wasting-away
process called autolysis. (R. 296). Further reliance was
placed upon the doctor's statement that he could tell
whether the holes in the retina were caused by deterioration or trauma and that the holes in appellant's retina
were most likely caused by autolysis (deterioration). (R.
298).
The hearing examiner indicated additional evidence
supporting his findings such as the pre-existing propensity
or disposition of appellant to have a detachment of his
retina. (R. 298 & 299).
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Throughout the Commission's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law no mention is made of the examiner's
reliance upon the statement by Mrs. Pruce that appellant
had been having difficulty with his eye for six weeks, the
statement which appellant claims was inadmissible evidence and reversible error.
Dr. Rees testified that he had treated the appellant
over a period dating back to September 1, 1955, (R. 227).
On May 8, 1967, prior to the alleged industrial injury,
Dr. Rees saw the appellant regarding his complaints of a
dark spot in his right eye. The doctor stated that his examination discovered operculum (floaters) in the vitreous. (R. 230). Both of these conditions were evidence of
appellant's predispostion for a detached retina. (R. 254).
In fact, appellant was given follow-up appointments "to
determine if there would follow from this detached vitreous a detachment of the retina." (R. 235). The appellant
was examined again on June 24, 1967, and released. (R.
235).
The next time appellant was seen by Dr. Rees was on
May 6, 1968, presumably subsequent to the alleged landing-gear incident, the date of which is uncertain. At that
time appellant complained of blurred vision in his right
eye. (R. 237). Dr. Rees found three holes in appellant's
retina in the immediate area of the detachment. (R. 246).
There was also an accumulation of liquid behind the
retina (R. 248) significant in Dr. Ree's words because:
If there is an open hole, fluid is passed through
the hole, raising the retnia from its blood vessel
bed. Then dissection or separation of the retina
from its blood vessel bed usually follows.
10

Q.

And it follows in an expanding or progressive
method?

A.

Yes. (R. 249).

Therefore, holes which develop m the retina may
lead to a detached retina. (R. 248).
Appellant's position is that he had experienced difficulty with his right eye for three or four days before he
saw Dr. Rees. (R. 263). When asked if it was equally
possible for detachment to occur within three or four
days or over a longer period, Dr. Rees indicated that detachments are more apt to take place slowly than they are
rapidly. (R. 254). Dr. Rees stated conclusively that the
condition of appellant's eye made it predisposed to having
a detached retina. (R. 254).
It was further pointed out that during the May 6,

1968, examination there was no mention by appellant
concerning the alleged industrial injury. (R. 255). The
first record in the doctor's file of any such incident was
on September 17, 1969, one year and four months after
the alleged injury. (R. 255). Dr. Ree's customary procedure is to inquire at the time of taking the patient's history whether there have been events relating to the condition complained of. He said he would normally record
such a report of injury. He also suggested that he expected that a patient would volunteer such information
regarding an injury in the event the doctor failed to inquire. Yet, no record of the injury appears in the history taken by Dr. Rees. (R. 256). Appellant himself admits that he didn't tell Dr. Rees about the landing gear
incident during his first examination. (R. 71).
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Answering the question of whether his optnmn of
the cause of the detached retina would have been different had he known about the injury appellant allegedly
suffered, Dr. Rees said:
A.

Well, I certainly would have taken cognizance of it. But certain factors in the examination and the type holes and the type detachment that he had I would have disregarded
it.

Q.

Completely disregarded it?

A.

No. You don't completely disregard anything.
I would have disregarded it as a major factor
in his detachment. I would have felt - because of these things I am talking about, in
my examination - I would have felt that this
was not just of this duration.
(R. 286).

During the questioning of Dr. Rees by appellant's
attorney, Mr. Echard, an interesting turn of events occurred, drawing comment by the hearing examiner in his
Findings of Fact:
As a normal rule, the Commission gives great
weight to the findings and conclusions of the
Medical Panel in contrast to the conclusions of
the treating physician because the Panel Report
reflects the considered opinion of three specialists
in the field on an independent basis. The treating
physician on the other hand, though he too may
be a specialist, as is true in the instant case, may
nevertheless have a natural bias in favor of his
patient because of their doctor-patient relationship.
In this case, however, we have the very unusual
situation in which the Medical Panel supports the
Applicant's claim and the treating physician feels
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obligated to express a contrary op1mon that the
Applicant's detached retina was probably not the
result of the alleged industrial injury. It was very
obvious to the Hearing Examiner at the time of the
Hearing that the treating physician was very reluctant to testify concerning his opinion and objective findings and that he would very much have
liked to help the Applicant but recognized his professional responsibility to state his honest opinion.
This demeanor and candor is emphasized by the
following exerpts from his testimony:

Q.

Now, Doctor, at the time you examined Mr.
Pruce on May 6, 1967 - May 8th, I believe
is the date that it was corrected to - May
20, 1967, and June 24, 1967, did you find any
evidence of any holes in the retina developing, by cyst or any other method?

A. Yes, he had a cyst. But he didn't have any
holes.

Q.

Did he have a cyst in the location where the
holes in the retina were?

A. He had cysts all over the peripheral retina.

Everybody does. Peripheral retinal cyst.
Cystic degeneration.

Q.

Now you cannot tell us then whether these
holes developed from trauma, from development from a cyst, -

A. Yes.

Q.

-or developing from some other source or
cause?

A. Yes. Usually I can.
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Q.

Could you in this case?

THE WITNESS: May I ask a question of the
court? If I am about to give testimony which is
contrary to what the lawyer wants for his client,
is it right for me to go ahead with this?
THE REFEREE: If he asks the question, you
should answer it.
MR. ECHARD: Just answer what I did ask.
THE WITNESS: (To Reporter) Will you
read it back, please?
(Thereupon, a portion of the proceedings was
read by the Reporter.)
A.

I could tell that these were holes which were
formed by minor trauma at the most, and
most likely autolysis." (Line 16, Page 84,
through Line 19, Page 85, Transcript of December 17, 1970 Hearing).
(R. 297-298).

Following the Commission's initial decision denying
appellant's claim, appellant's attorney filed a Motion for
Review along with a memorandum supporting that position. An opposing memo by defendant was likewise filed.
In its Order dated August 23, 1971, the Commission
sustained its earlier findings, specifying the evidence relied upon in its decision:
We believe applicant's claim is weakened by his
inconsistent position prior to filing his compensation claim. For example:
1.

He filed a claim ]\fay 24, with Connecticut
General Insurance Company where he answered two questions as follows:
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a. Is accident or sickness due to employment?
Ans.: No.
b Have you or will you file a claim for
workmen's compensationAns.: No.
2.

He failed to indicate to his doctor that he had
suffered an industrial accident.

3.

Upon admittance to the hospital he indicated
"Connecticut" as the responsible carrier.

In addition to the weakness above indicated, we
believe the medical facts are stronger against an
award. The attending physician testified that holes
in the retina and detachment can occur through
normal everyday activities in the absence of trauma
(Tr., p. 75, 2nd hearing). He further indicated
that hole formation could be a common aging process (Tr., p. 75 and 70, 2nd hearing). The doctor
also stated that the holes could be caused by trauma
or cysts (Tr., p. 85, 2nd hearing), and that applicant had Systs (sic), but no holes ten months before when examined by him. (Tr., p. 84, 2nd hearing). The doctor further explained that in his
opinion the holes were formed most likely by autolysis (Tr., p. 85, 2nd hearing), which he described
as being associated with peripheral retinal cysts
(Tr., p. 82 & 83, 2nd hearing). The doctor also
testified that the rapid progression of a detachment
was less common than slow progression (Tr., p.
73, 2nd hearing). It would appear that the attending physician based his decision on facts outside of the controversy involving the alleged hearsay statement that applicant had had problems for
about six months prior to his seeing Dr. Rees.
We believe there is sufficient doubt surrounding
the incident which allegedly caused the detachment
that along with the above testimony we are warranted in sustaining the hearing examiner's order.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion
for Review filed by appellant on or about March
15, 1971, shall be and is hereby denied.

(R. 334-335).

C.

THE MEDICAL PANEL'S OPINION, BASED UPON AN ASSUMPTION THAT APPELLANT WAS INJURED AS CLAIMED,
SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN MORE WEIGHT
THAN THE OTHER EVIDENCE BEFORE
THE COMMISSION.

Appellant's claim was originally heard by the Commission on April 8, 1970. Following that hearing the examiner submitted certain medical questions to a Medical
Panel. (R. 170,171). In his letter to the Medical Panel,
the hearing examiner set out the facts of the landing gear
incident as alleged by the appellant during the hearing
and instructed the Medical Panel:
The Medical Panel has no jurisdiction to determine whether or not an "accident" occurred but
it may assume that the facts surrounding the landing gear episode are true.
The Panel was asked to determine medical questions
relating to appellant's psysical impairment and period of
time he would be disabled. The Panel was then asked:
As a reasonable medical probability, was the landing gear episode the sole cause of the applicant's
detached retina; and, if not, was it a precipitating
factor of material consequence. (R. 171).
The Panel's response to this last question was:
As a reasonable medical probability, the landing
gear episode would be the conspicuous cause of the
detached retina. (R. 172).

16

The Commission's question asked if the assumed accident was the ''sole cause" or, if not, if it was a material
"precipitating factor.''
The Panel's reply was not responsive by saying that
the incident was the "conspicuous cause.'' Such an opinion, based upon the instructions to the Panel that it was
to be assumed that the Industrial incident occurred, should
not be given more weight than the other evidence before
the Commission, upon which its findings were based.

D.

THE HOSPITAL RECORDS, ADMITTED
WITHOUT OBJECTION, CONTAIN IDENTICAL INFORMATION AS THAT OBJECTED TO BY APPELLANT AS HEARSAY.

Appellant objects to a statement by Dr. Rees, which
he attributed to appellant's wife. The objection taken
under advisement, Dr. Rees testified that at the time of
his May 8, 1968, examination of appellant, Mrs. Pruce
disagreed with her husband, saying he had been having
trouble for six weeks rather than three or four days. (R.
245). Regardless of the admissibility of the statement,
the same evidence, and even in more precise form, is contained in the history sheet and the progress notes of the
hospital records, all of which were received in evidence
and without objection by appellant's attorney. (R. 122,
130).
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CONCLUSION
While it is true that the Commission's denial of appellant's claim cannot be based exclusively upon hearsay,
it is also clear that if there is other competent evidence
which is supported and corroborated by the hearsay evidence, the Commission's findings should be sustained.
Ogden Ironworks vs. Industrial Commission, (supra). The
hospital records, appellant's predisposition to retinal detachment, presence of holes in the retina caused by deterioration or wasting according to appellant's own ophthamologist, the same doctor's opinion that the detachment was caused by the natural and progressive process
of deterioration of the retina, the absence of early communication to the doctor of the alleged industrial accident, and the appellant's initial handling of the case under
his health and accident insurance policy, all corroborate
Mrs. Pruce's statement that her husband had been having
difficulty with his eye longer than three or four days.
There is therefore, ample evidence upon which to base the
Commission's Findings and its denial of appellant's claim
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT W. BRANDT, and
ROBERT W. MILLER
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondents

